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In this paper I am developing the theses that argumentation is a means 
for extending knowledge. The theses are founded on two focal points:1. 
Reasoning is designed for argumentation, and 2. Argumentation process 
is an exceptionally successful media that provokes usage of methods reli-
able for the extension of knowledge. The fi rst point relies on Sperber’s 
and Mercier’s evolutionary psychological approach to argumentation 
which I consider the most convincing theory in the fi eld. Taking this 
ground as a departing point, the goal of the paper is to broaden this ap-
proach with epistemological insights that I base on Williamson’s safety 
theory of knowledge. 
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In this paper I am going to combine two apparently distinct approaches 
to argumentation. The fi rst one is an evolutionary psychological ap-
proach to argumentation while the second is a rather highly theoretic 
epistemic understanding of knowledge. I am going to argue for the 
claim that the argumentation process is a particularly good means for 
the extension of knowledge. Also, there are two focal points around 
which the paper is organised. The fi rst point is 
a) The function of reasoning and the nature and the structure of the 
argumentative process, while the second is
b) Argumentation process as an exceptionally successful media that 
provokes usage of methods reliable for the extension of knowl-
edge.
Concerning the fi rst point, Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier do excellent 
work in a series of articles. In their valuable contribution to the cogni-
tive science, their naturalistic, evolutionary-oriented theory develops 
and explains the topic of my fi rst point. Their great result contributing 
to the cognitive science is their explanation of the relationship between 
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inference and argumentation.1 They have shown convincingly that rea-
soning is evolutionally designed for argumentation, more precisely, 
“that reasoning is best adapted for its role in argumentation, which 
should therefore be seen as its main function” (Mercier and Sperber 
2011: 59). When a reasoning mechanism, they argue, is employed to do 
what it is designed to do—fi nding and evaluation of reasons through 
argumentation—it works well and produces good performance. In this 
paper I will heavily rely on their results but also extend their evolu-
tionary approach offering an epistemic contribution to the naturalistic 
theory of argumentation.
To connect evolutionary cognitive theory of argumentation and ar-
gumentative process’ aptitude for the extension of knowledge, I need 
a suitable epistemological theory. The epistemological theory I am en-
dorsing here and the notion of knowledge it develops perfectly suits my 
purposes. The theory I am going to employ is Timothy Williamson’s 
highly innovative epistemological theory (2000, 2009), which bases the 
notion of knowledge on the safety principle. I will explore Williamson’s 
safety theory in its general form as the theory of safe knowledge, but 
also in its dynamic aspect accounting for the process of safe deriva-
tion.
My basic idea, combining these two approaches, is to show that the 
argumentation process naturally guides participants to extend their 
knowledge given that a) reasoning has a biological function to work 
optimally in argumentation, and b) that the very argumentative pro-
cess is structured so that it optimally supports participants’ epistemic 
curiosity to acknowledge whether a proposition P (the object of discus-
sion) is true.
Let me take my starting point at two statements emphasised by 
Sperber and Marcier. Supporting their theses with a great number of 
research, they claim:
1. Advantage of group reasoning theses (AGRT): Groups do better at 
reasoning tasks than individuals, and, in some cases, do even bet-
ter than any of their individual members (occasionally even better 
than their best member).
An effective account for this asymmetry between individual and group 
performance is:
2. Evolutionary thesis (ET): refl ective reasoning has been designed 
by evolution as a communicative competence (rather than aiming 
at enhancing individual inference).
They claim, more precisely “that reasoning is best adapted for its role 
in argumentation, which should therefore be seen as its main func-
tion” (Mercier and Sperber 2011: 59). When a reasoning mechanism 
is employed to do what it is designed to do—fi nding and evaluation of 
reasons through argumentation—it works well and produces good per-
1 See Mercier and Sperber (2011) and Sperber and Mercier (2012).
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formance. My view concerning argumentation as a means for extend-
ing knowledge is quite in accord with these two claims.
Let me put forward some preliminaries. In a very general sense, I 
consider argumentation to be the most advanced form of communica-
tion in the sense that it requires participants’ refl ection and engage-
ment of their inferential abilities in a much higher degree than it is the 
case in other forms of communication. I also understand argumenta-
tion as a social, two-sided (usually informationally asymmetric) tem-
poral process in which two sides enter, each with some initial stock of 
beliefs, and through the process consisting of producing and evaluating 
arguments, each of them eventually reach the point where they know 
more than they did before.
It is important to emphasise here that as a central and important 
situation of argumentation I consider the case where addresser sin-
cerely believes that P but does not know whether P. She has some ini-
tial beliefs about proposition P, but neither she nor the addressee still 
know whether P is true or false. I am arguing that curiosity whether 
P is true is, at lest implicitly, an important motive for entering the 
argumentation process. It might seem that the urge to convince the 
other side is the strongest motive in argumentation. But, it is hard to 
convince someone that P is true if it is not the case and the addresser 
is uncertain about that.
The basic form of curiosity in the argumentation process is whether 
a proposition P, relevant to the cognizer, is true or false. I am calling 
this type of curiosity propositional curiosity, in contrast to other types, 
such as the curiosity whether the bus will depart on time, or whether 
she is pretty as it is said. In the argumentation process, the proposi-
tional form of curiosity underlines all other curiosity forms. One might 
object that participants in the argumentation process can be, and often 
are, curious in a non-propositional way. For instance, one might en-
ter the argumentation process just being curious whether he is good 
enough to win in a discussion. But, the discussion is always organized 
around a claimed proposition P. After all, the addresser, claiming that 
P, counts as a winner only if she has convinced the other side that P is 
true. Although the question of P being true or false at the beginning of 
the process might be non-existent for her, at some point in the argu-
mentation process the question whether P is true will arise and become 
important. Both sides are propositionally curious whether P. But, I am 
arguing that the propositional form of curiosity is implicitly present 
as a motivating element. The propositional curiosity, which up to a 
certain point in argumentation was implicit, at that point turns out to 
be explicit and important.
Here is a rough idea about the structure of the argumentation pro-
cess. Since the argumentation process is the most advanced form of 
communication, let us see how to get from communication to argumen-
tation. Communication is a central form of social practice, which, be-
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sides other purposes, has a goal of giving and receiving information. In 
a communication process one can be informed truly or be deceived. The 
advantage of true information is obvious as well as the danger of being 
misled. To judge the putative information correctly one should possess 
a number of cognitive abilities among which the inferential ability is 
one of the most important. To use Sperber’s and Mercier’s formulation, 
the inferential ability and its result, reasoning, is traditionally meant 
as ”mental action of working out a convicting argument, the public ac-
tion of verbally producing this argument so that other will be convinced 
by it and the mental action of evaluating and accepting the conclusion 
of an argument” (Sperber and Mercier 2011: 59).
Communication as a social practice is a process in which the inform-
er claims a statement (conveys a piece of information) and an addressee 
evaluates the acceptability of the conveyed information. The informa-
tion we are interested in might have a form of a sentential claim that 
something is the case (that P). The informer is claiming that P, while 
an addressee, on the other hand, evaluates (in most cases implicitly, 
intuitively) the acceptability of the claim. In such a simple communica-
tion process, the addressee evaluates the trustworthiness of the source 
and checks the consistency of the content of a claim with her previously 
held beliefs. It is hard to believe that one will blindly trust the source. 
Rather, the degree of trust depends on the context, the addressee’s in-
terest and the relevance of information.
However, human communication is usually not as simple as it is 
stated. In human communication, participants usually not only give 
and receive information but the addresser also offers supporting rea-
sons or good ground for her claim. The addressee not only evaluates 
the trustworthiness of the source and the consistency of the content 
of a claim with her other beliefs, but also the connection between the 
reason and the claim. Here the reasoning, as the ability for producing 
arguments and evaluating them, comes into play. It is the form of com-
munication consisting of the claim, reason(s) (or evidence) supporting it 
and the relation between the claim and the reasons, where the addresser 
produces a claim and reasons while an addressee evaluates it, that I 
will consider as argumentation.
Now, we have a familiar structure. In such a simple argumentation 
situation the addresser claims that P and P is a proposition of the form 
“an object O has a property F”. In support of her claim she provides 
reasons r1, …, rn. Claim-content P stands in a kind of consequential 
relation to r1, …, rn. The addressee evaluates the argument fi nding rea-
sons–claim relation acceptable or refutable. In both cases one makes a 
decision whether to accept or refute the relation. 
Let us take the central case of argumentation situation to be, as it 
has been mentioned, the one in which the addresser sincerely believes 
what she is claiming to be true (or highly probable) and has a good 
ground (according to her own lights) for it, while the addressee wants 
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to make an effort to fi nd out whether this is the case. Each of the par-
ticipants is primarily interested (curious) in the truth of the claim. The 
addressee wants to avoid false beliefs by hypothesis, while the address-
er, sincerely believing that P is committed to the belief that belief in P 
is true (because P implies that P is true).2 This is the argumentation 
format I am interested in, letting aside other possible argumentation 
situations. The stipulation that each participant is primarily interested 
in the truth of the claim is to be examined in more detail.
In their attempt to convince other, people actually tend to neglect 
the objective search for the truth and “they are typically looking for 
arguments and evidence to confi rm their own claim, and ignoring nega-
tive arguments and evidence unless they anticipate having to rebut 
them” (Mercier and Sperber 2011: 63). The confi rmation bias, Mercier 
and Sperber claim, “is a feature of reasoning when used for the produc-
tion of arguments” (Mercier and Sperber 2011: 63). Namely, given that 
addresser, believing (and claiming) that P is committed to the belief 
that a belief in non-P is false (for P implies that P is true), has no moti-
vation to fi nd out whether P is false. The confi rmation bias has been de-
tected as a common fallacy in individual reasoning or in reasoning with 
like-minded peers. In the argumentation process, the confi rmation bias 
leads participants to reinforce their initial beliefs producing individual 
polarization. Nevertheless, I will try to show that the argumentation 
process has resources to remedy the confi rmation bias.
Tim Williamson depicted the bias in a stronger form: “One is bound 
to think any given belief of his own superior in truth-value to the con-
trary beliefs of others” (Williamson 2007: 247). Fortunately, William-
son offers a remedy that nicely fi ts my approach. He says:
But sometimes we step back of our beliefs and regard them as psychological 
phenomena on a par with the belief of others, in equal need of both psycho-
logical explanation and epistemological criticism. (Williamson 2007: 247)
I will try to show that the argumentation situation is exactly the situ-
ation that prompts one to “step back” in the described way. Further-
more, I will argue that the very argument structure has the effect of 
prompting participants to “step back” and that this very structure en-
hances participant’s inferential abilities.
This stepping back provides additional motivation for the addresser 
to evaluate her own beliefs as well as her inferential steps. If it were 
the case it would be plausible to suppose that fi rstly, participants are 
interested in the truth and, secondly, that applying the appropriate 
notion of knowledge, it would be plausible to show that the argumenta-
tion process is a good means for the extension of knowledge. Let me fi rst 
offer an account of how argumentation enhances individual reasoning 
abilities and therefore increases the chances for reaching the truth.
2 It is of course possible that the addresser does not believe that P is true 
(sincerely believes that P is false) and still wants to deceive the addressee that P is 
the case, but I am not counting this situation as an argumentation process.
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Just as the tendency to commit confi rmation bias is a natural ten-
dency in reasoning, the argumentation process has powerful resources 
for de-biasing the bias. The integral part and an important feature 
of the argumentation process, detected by Sperber, is the ‘epistemic 
vigilance’ of participants (Sperber et al. 2010). Participants in an ar-
gumentation are likely to display a higher degree of epistemic caution, 
to be epistemic vigilant, more that it would be the case in individually 
acknowledging the true state of the affair. This notion of ‘epistemic 
vigilance’ is based on the importance of getting the true information 
and avoiding the false one.
The possible explanation for such articulated epistemic vigilance 
lies, I suggest, in the difference in roles participants may play in the 
argumentation process. The epistemic status of the addresser and the 
epistemic status of the addressee points to quite different roles of each 
of the two in the argumentation process. The role of the addresser is 
to claim that P and to provide (or make explicit) the reasons that sup-
port the claim. As we said before, the addresser is inclined to provide 
more and more reasons for her claim. Concerning this tendency, em-
pirical investigations report about a strong confi rmation bias in the 
argumentation. It should be noted, however, that participants might 
switch their roles in the process. At the same time, in the role of the 
addresser, one is under obligation to display reasons for one’s claim 
and to get them in the relation to the claim in a way maximally under-
standable and clear to the addressee. In other words, one will make it 
accessible/knowledgeable to the addressee as much as possible. Here is 
how Dan Sperber describes the process:
One way to persuade one’s addressees is to help them check the consistency 
of what one is claiming with what they believe, or even better if possible, 
to help them realize that it would be inconsistent with what they already 
believe not to accept one’s claim. The communicator is better off making 
an honest display of the very consistency addressees are anyhow check-
ing. This amounts to, instead of just making a claim, giving reasons why it 
should be accepted, arguing for it. (Sperber & Mercier 2012)
On the other hand, the role of the addressee is to evaluate the accept-
ability of P assessing the reasons and their relation to the claim. The 
addressee will do her best to fi nd counterexamples to the addresser’s 
argument and in this way falsify her claim, if possible. The role of the 
addressee thus creates a signifi cant counterbalance to the confi rmation 
bias the addressor is prone to. The fact that participants are committed 
to playing different roles and their different goals gives the argumenta-
tion process the power to add something to the extension of knowledge. 
Let me elaborate a little. The participants in the argumentation pro-
cess are individual reasoners with their reasoning competences and 
abilities as well as their practical and epistemic goals. Let us take, 
to reiterate, a simple argumentation situation in which one party is 
claiming that P and the other party is suspicious whether this is the 
case.
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Taking that the addresser sincerely believes that P is true while the 
addressee does not want to be misinformed and led astray, they, obvi-
ously, enter the process with different, even opposing goals. There is, 
on the one hand, a practical goal of convincing one, and also a practical 
goal to avoid misinformation, on the other. But, it seems that behind 
these practical goals, there is a more fundamental one. I suggest that 
it is the epistemic goal of acquiring knowledge. Each party is doing 
whatever is in their intellectual power to fi nd out whether that which 
is claimed is true.
Here is a rough and overall description of the process. In argumen-
tation, both the addresser (S) and the addressee (S’) are involved in 
two distinct courses of action, producing the arguments and evaluating 
them, because of changing their roles in discussion. Production of the 
argument as an inferential action is naturally subject to the confi rma-
tion bias. The evaluation of the produced argument, on the other side, 
is not. It has an effect of de-biasing the process. These two inferential 
actions mutually support each other creating a method for broadening 
initial knowledge possessed by both participants.
This structural description, stated so far, obviously needs its dy-
namic part, the epistemic account for the advancement of knowledge 
in the process. I take the initial epistemic situation to be something 
like the following. Both parties have some initial knowledge concerning 
P that they arguing about. S sincerely believes P, but does not know 
whether P is true. Still, she does know some facts concerning P. S’ is 
also acquainted with some facts concerning P, in less certain way then 
S. S’ also doesn’t know whether P. But, both of them, being involved in 
producing and evaluating arguments, are in a way forced to be curious, 
whether P.
Let me use an example. Poirot and his assistant, Colonel Hastings, 
investigate the case of a homicide. In this example, Hastings is the one 
who is proposing the solution. In the argumentation process, Colonel 
Hastings claims that it is the gardener who is the murderer and offers 
reasons. Reasons are based on the following evidence, i.e., there is the 
knife, which, beyond reasonable doubt, has been proven to belong to 
the gardener. There is victim’s blood on the knife. The gardener has no 
alibi. Poirot might accept the evidence as suffi cient for the conclusion 
or deny it evaluating the argument, re-examining evidences. He may 
point out to some equivalence unnoticed to the good colonel. Also, he 
can help him to recognize some obviousness the colonel did not recog-
nize before. Poirot and Hastings have some knowledge about P, wheth-
er the gardener is a murderer, but do not have the knowledge whether 
this is true or not. Through the argumentation process they have to 
safely extend their initial knowledge in the way that, in the optimal 
case, they reach the point of knowing who the murderer is, or in the 
less optimal case, to know more than they did at the beginning of the 
argumentation.
230 N. Smokrović, Argumentation as a Means for Extending Knowledge
Let me introduce the epistemic theory I fi nd most appropriate. The 
epistemic theory that I take as suitable for the idea of extension of 
knowledge is Tim Williamson’s knowledge theory based on the safety 
principle. Williamson’s theory is one of the few notable attempts to 
improve Gettier’s justifi ed true belief theory of knowledge, and at the 
same time, to give an alternative solution to famous Nozick’s sensitivity 
based theory. Due to space limitation, I am going to give a very sketchy 
presentation of Williamson’s theory.
Avoiding formulating the theory in terms of necessary and joint-
ly suffi cient condition for knowledge, Williamson founded the model 
of knowledge in the concept of safe avoidance of error. Accordingly, 
S knows P only if S is safe from error. As Williamson stated: “If one 
knows, one could not easily have been wrong in a similar case” (Wil-
liamson 2000: 147).3 Skipping the subtlety, I am going to maintain only 
those moments of the theory relevant for my purpose.
The cases or conditions important for determining the similarity 
can be determined by the set {S,M,P,T}, where S denotes a cognizer, M 
a method, P proposition and T a time in which S believes P. A further 
formulation is the following:
“In a case α one is safe from error in believing that (a condition) 
C obtains if and only if there is no case close to α in which one falsely 
believes that C obtains” (Williamson 2000: 126–7). A condition C is 
specifi ed by “that” close relative to an agent and the time. In our Poirot 
example, C is the belief “gardener is a murderer”.
Williamson tackles the concept of safety differently at different 
places, introducing the concept (together with concepts of “reliability 
and unreliability, stability and instability, safety and danger, robust-
ness and fragility”) he claims that they refer to modal states. They con-
cern “what would easily have happened” (Williamson 2000: 123). In 
the epistemic situation safety is attributed to knowledge and belief. In 
such a situation what easily would have happened is the cognizer be-
ing wrong or right in respect to some proposition P. S’s being right in a 
particular situation counts as knowledge if S could not easily have been 
wrong in similar situations.
Since safety principle does not put a necessary and suffi cient condi-
tion upon knowledge, it is consistent with counterfactual: if P had been 
false, one would (or might) still have believed P. Accordingly, safety 
does not imply omniscience. What is important is that one can start 
with a non-safe knowledge and reach the safe knowledge eventually. 
Furthermore, safe is a gradable adjective. One state of believing can be 
more or less safer than the other. I will take that safe knowledge is a 
fi nal state of the process in which one starts with a less safe knowledge 
reaching a more safe state. As Williamson says, “One’s total evidence 
3 This formulation of safety condition signifi cantly differs from Sosa’s 
counterfactual formulation: “If S were to believe P, P would be true” (Sosa 1999: 
146). Formally:  (B(P) → P).
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is one’s total knowledge” (Williamson 2000: 9). Applying elements of 
Williamson’s theory to the argumentation process, let us start from the 
following formulation:
S safely believes P in situation α, if, using method M in time T, S truly be-
lieves P and could not easily have been wrong in similar situations β.
Applying Poirot’s example at the time T, Hastings believes that the gar-
dener is a murderer, founding his belief on evidence (the knife, blood 
and alibi) about which he has safe knowledge. Let us take that this 
knowledge is based on perception and direct experience. Also, Hastings 
forms a further belief that the gardener is the murderer, basing his 
belief on the affi rming of consequence (AC) inference. 
Of course, AC is the unreliable method and cannot bestow safe 
knowledge. But, the argumentation process is the reliable media that 
can provide means for the revision of false beliefs. Poirot’s evaluation 
of Hastings’ argument will make it clear to Hastings that he needs to 
abandon AC and use the modus ponens instead. Furthermore, Poirot 
might re-examine the evidences, refute some of them, fi nd a new piece 
of evidence and offer the conclusion that it is not the gardener but the 
driver who is the murderer. To generalise a little, the argumentation 
process is the reliable media that is able to select, among those methods 
at hand, the ones that are more reliable. Using reliable methods, par-
ticipants are in the position to reach safe knowledge. In this way, the 
argumentation is a media that increases their deductive competences. 
Learning to use reliable methods and increasing their deductive com-
petences, it is likely that one will acquire safe knowledge (about P), in 
the way that one could not easily have been wrong in similar cases.
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